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WILLIAM BARR’ 
ABSTRACT. In 1933 the newly-formed Gluvsevmorput’ (Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route) dispatched the first convoy of 
freighters via the Northern Sea Route to the mouth of the Lena to deliver cargoes bound for the Yakut ASSR. It consisted of three freighters 
and was escorted by the icebreaker Krusin. Despite heavy ice conditions in the Kara Sea two of the ships reached Tiksi, their destination, 
and unloaded their cargoes. The third ship, bound for Bukhta Nordvik with an oil exploration expedition, ran aground near  its destination 
and turned back. Severe ice conditions in Proliv Vil’kitskogo forced all three ships to winter at the Ostrova b u i l a .  A shore  station was 
built and a full scientific programme maintained all winter. Urvantsev, the chief scientist, took the opportunity to make a winter 
reconnaissance survey of the northern portion of Poluostrov Taymyr using half-tracks. The convoy was freed from the k e  by the  icebreaker 
Fedor Like in the summer of 1934 and having completed their tasks all three ships ultimately returned safely to Arkhangel’sk. 
Key words: Soviet Northern SeaRoute,  LenaRiver, navigation, marine transport, icebreakers, convoys, Poluostrov Taymyr, Nordvik, oil 
exploration, wintering, all-terrain vehicles 
RhSUMh. En 1933, la nouvelle administration Gluvsevmorpur’ (Administration centrale de la route de la Mer du Nord) a mis en  route le 
premier convoi de navires de charge naviguant par la route de la Mer  du Nord jusqu’a l’embouchure de  la Lena afin de livrer des 
chargements il destination de Yakutsk, en R.S.S.A. I1 s’agissait de trois navires de charge escortes du brise-glace Krusin.  Mdme aux glaces 
abondantes dans le Mer de  Kara, deux des navires ont pu amarrer B leur destination de Tiksi et decharger leur cargaison. Le troisibme 
navire, en route pour Bukhta Nordvik avec une expedition d‘exploration &trolif&re, s’est dchout prks de sa destination et a dO rebrousser 
chemin. D’intenses conditions glaciaires Proliv Vil’kitskogo ont forct les trois navires B passer l’hiver il Ostrova Samuila. On a donc 
procede il la construction d’une station c6tBre afin de continuer un programme scientifique complet tout au cours de l’hiver. Le scientifique 
principal, Urvantsev, a profite de l’occasion pour effectuer une levee de reconnaissance d’hiverde  la section nord de Poluostrov Taymyr, il 
l’aide de v6hicules B chenilles. Le convoi a et6 libert? de laglace parle brise-glaceFedorLitke lors de 1’CtC de 1934 et, leur mission accomplie, 
les navires ont pu retourner sans danger B Arkhangel’sk. 
Mots cles: Route de la  Mer du Nord sovietique, rivitre  Lena, navigation, transport maritime, brise-glace, convois, Poluostrov Taymyr, 
Nordvik, exploration pbtrolifbre, hivernement, vkhicules tout-temain 
Traduit pour le journal par Maurice Guibord. 
The past few decades have seen some interesting shifts in 
emphasis  with  regard to movement  of  freight o and from 
the Yakut  ASSR. prior to 1954 the Northern Sea Route 
had played an important role, with goods being trans- 
shipped  from  seagoing vessels to river craft at the port of 
Tiksi; up to 25% of the freight reaching Yakutiya was 
handled  in  this  manner  (Armstrong, 1980). But  in 1954 the 
rail  link  from Tayshet on the Trans-Siberian  Railway to 
Ust’-kut on the upper Lena was  opened  and its river port 
of Osetrovo was  opened  soon afterwards. Thereafter the 
emphasis  with  regard to supplying  Yakutiya  shifted  almost 
completely  from the Northern Sea Route to the southern 
railhiver route. Thus by 1961 only 3% of incoming  freight 
was  being  handled  by the Northern SeaRoute (Armstrong, 
1980) as against 80435% by Osetrovo by the mid-seventies 
(Shabad, 1979a). In 1980 Ust’-kut handled close to 3.2 
million tonnes of  oil products (Shabad, 1981). 
But by that stage Osetrovo was becoming a serious 
bottleneck, particularly because of the shallow depths on 
the upper Lena. Problems  and delays were even worse in 
the case of freight  travelling  down the Lena, then along the 
coast to the Yana or Indigirka  and  up those rivers (Belin- 
skiy, 1978). As aresult, since 1978 the emphasis  has tarted 
to shift  back  to the Northern Sea Route and the status of 
Tiksi as a transshipment port for goods  bound for Y akutiya 
has  risen  dramatically (Shabad, 1979b). Most  significantly 
the port of Tiksi is undergoing  major expansions, the main 
improvement  involving the building  of a deep-water  pier 
136 m long (Shabad, 1981). In the light  of these facts the 
events surrounding the progress of the first Soviet  convoy 
to reach the mouth of the Lena almost  half a century ago 
help to place the present activity in context. 
In 1932 two interrelated events occurred which  would 
have  far-reaching impacts on the development of the Soviet 
Arctic. On 1 October 1932 the  icebreaking  steamer Sibityukm 
emerged  from the ice  in  Bering Strait having  completed 
the first one-season passage of the Northern Sea Route 
from  Arkhangel’sk (Barr, 1978; Vize, 1946; Belov, 1959). 
It was  not  an  unqualified success, however; Sibiryukov had 
lost her  propeller two weeks  previously  and  had  managed 
to reach the edge of the ice  only under improvised  sails  and 
with a large  measure of luck. The other related event was 
the creation on 17 December, by the Soviet of Peoples’ 
Commissars of the USSR, of the organization Gluvnoye 
Upravleniye Severnogo Morskogo Puri (Chief  Administration 
of the Northern Sea Route), commonly  known as Gluvsev- 
morput’. It was furnished with  extremely  wide  powers  and 
was  given the task of developing the Northern Sea Route 
as a commercial  waterway (Belov, 1969). 
Two operations were planned for the following season 
(1933), both representing attempts by the new  organiza- 
tion to demonstrate its capabilities. First an attempt was 
made to show that the problems which Sibiryukov had 
encountered  could now be mastered; to this  end the steamer 
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Chelyuskin again attempted the passage of the entire North- 
ern Sea Route, but  with even more disastrous results. She 
became best in the ice of the Chukchi Sea and after drifting 
helplessly for several months, was finally crushed and 
sank  early in 1934 (Schmidt et al., 1935; Belov, 1969). This 
entire operation received  great  publicity,  particularly  since 
the evacuation of the ship’s  personnel  from the ice by 
means of a remarkable airlift operation was brilliantly 
successful. The other operation, the first attempt at send- 
ing a convoy of freighters to the mouth of the Lena, though 
not  an  unqualified success was certainly not as disastrous 
as the Chelyuskin episode, but has tended to be over- 
shadowed  by  it  and  has  received littleattention from arctic 
historians, especially in the English-speaking  world (Fig. 
1). 
Prior to 1933 freight movements to Yakutiya via the 
Northern Sea Route had  been no more  than a trickle. After 
the arrival of the diminutive steamer Lena, which had 
reached the Lena delta from the west in 1878, escorted by 
Nordenskiold’s Vega, no cargo reached the Lena system 
from the sea again  until 1926, and even then it represented 
only a coastwise movement. In that year the motor- 
schooner Polyarnaya Zvezda, commanded by Captain I.A. 
Korol’kov, hauled 41 tonnes of cargo from Nizhne- 
Kolymsk,  near the mouth of the Kolyma, to Tiksi  (Belov, 
1959). The following year the steamer Kolyma, under  Cap- 
tain P.G. Milovzorov,  successfully extended her normal 
run  from  Vladivostok to  the mouth of the Kolyma,  west- 
wards to Tiksi, delivering a mixed cargo of 415.2 tonnes, 
and returning safely to Vladivostok. This success pro- 
voked a proposal for annual voyages to the mouth of the 
Lena from the east, but when, under the command of 
Captain  P.V.  Sidnev, Kolyma attempted to repeat the exper- 
iment  in 1928 she was  brought to a halt by ice in  Proliv 
Lapteva and  was forced to winter  and  did  not return to 
Vladivostok until September, 1929. In view of this less- 
than-optimal  performance attempts at moving  freight to 
Yakutiya  were  discontinued thereafter, until 1933. 
The impetus for the expedition derived mainly from 
pressure exerted on  Moscow  by  local interests in Yakutiya 
(Belov, 1969). With industrial activity (especially  mining) 
in the Lena basin  expanding  rapidly, the existing transport 
connections involving roadwater links  were  totally  inad- 
equate to handle the freight  involved;  hence the newly 
formed Gluvsevmorput’ was  called  upon to dispatch a con- 
voy of freighters from  Arkhangel’sk to Tiksi, which  had 
been  identified as the most  appropriate  transshipment  point 
near the mouth  of the Lena. 
Soviet experience of handling convoys of freighters in 
arctic waters was already quite considerable. Convoys 
had  been  moving  freight to and  from the Yenisey  from the 
east on an annual and steadily expanding basis throughout 
the 1920s (Belov, 1959; Armstrong, 1952). And in the 
Soviet Far East the first convoy  had  reached the mouth of 
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the Kolyma from Vladivostok via Bering Strait in the 
summer of 1932 (Barr, 1979). 
The main icebreaker esqort would be provided by Krusin 
(Kapitan Ya. P. Legzdin). Three steamers, each of about 
3 100 tonnes displacement, normally  used for carrying  tim- 
ber and  with  no  special  ice  strengthening,  were selected 
for the expedition: Volodarskiy (Kapitan N.V. Smagin), 
Tovarishch Stalin (Kapitan Sergeyev) and Pravda (Kapitan 
Kh. A. Belitskiy),  Convoy leader (on board Volodarskiy) 
was  Kapitan M.A. Sorokin. To be strictly accurate only 
two of these ships  were to carry freight to Tiksi for various 
organizations in Yakutiya.  Their total cargoes  amounted 
to 5461 tonnes, mainly  mining  equipment and supplies  but 
also 1800 tonnes of rye flour and 326 tonnes of sugar 
(Belov, 1969). 
Pravda’s cargo consisted of 2430 tonnes of equipment 
and supplies for the first oil exploration expedition to 
Northern Siberia. In charge  was the veteran arctic geolo- 
gist N.N. Urvantsev, who  had discovered the important 
Noril’sk ore deposits only five years earlier and in the 
interim had filled the important role of surveyor on 
Ushakov’s exploratory expedition to Severnaya Zemlya 
(Barr, 1975). The new  expedition was bound for Bukhta 
Nordvik  where  an outcrop of rock salt in  a  hill  known as 
Tus-Takh on Poluostrov  Uryung  Tumus  was suspected of 
being a salt dome,  probably with oil  and gas associated 
with it. 
The  expedition personnel included Urvantsev himself, 
his  wife  Yelizaveta Ivanovna, who  was the medical  offi- 
cer, another husband-and-wife team consisting of 1.1. 
Lomakina  (meteorologist) and N.V.  Lomakin (hunteddog 
driver), drilling  chief  V.A.  Poluyanov,  drilling  foreman N. 
Ya.  Bolotnikov, drivers I.A.  Bizikin and G.G.  Kolobayev 
and mechanics M.A. Grachev and Chuykin. The latter 
four men were  in charge of four NATI-2  half-track  vehi- 
cles,  experimental models built by the Nauchnyy Avto- 
traktornyy Institut in  Moscow,  using a 1 ‘/2 tonne GAZ-AA 
truck as the basic  unit (Urvantsev, 1978). These, the first 
tracked vehicles to be used  in the Soviet Arctic, would 
haul the drill  rig,  buildings, and supplies  from the landing 
site to the drilling site. Apart from the drill  rig (a KA-500 
rig,  which  could  be broken down into components weigh- 
ing 50-75 kg)  and a fully  equipped ddling camp, Pravda’s 
cargo  also  included the rails, ties and  rolling stock for a 
narrow-gauge  railway  (Belov, 1969). 
A further task of the expedition, which has become 
practically  an annual event ever since, was the transfer of 
river craft via the Northern Sea Route to the Lena. The 
craft involved were a powerful tug, Pmaya Pyatiletka 
(KapitanA.N. Mekeshin),andasteellighterof3500tonnes 
capacity.(Belov, 1969). Both  had  previously operated on 
the Ob’. 
Tovarishch Stalin, Volodarskiy and Pravda sailed from 
Arkhangel’skon 8 August 1933. During the previous month 
Urvantsev and his  colleagues had not  only  loaded  all their 
equipment and supplies aboard ship themselves  owing to a 
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FIG. 2. ‘ h e  icebreaker Krasin (originally Svyatogor) leaving  the  Tyne  on 
her  maiden voyage in 1916. (Photo courtesy of Armstrong  Whitworth  and 
Co. and  Mr.  Edward Wilson,  Burntisland, Fife.) 
shortage of dockworkers, but  had even had to convert one 
of the holds into living quarters by knocking together 
bunks, tables and benches (Urvantsev, 1978). The last 
task (on the 7th)  was to load about a dozen cattle and  pigs 
which represented the expedition’s  meat  supply for the 
winter, and also Lomakin’s  dogteam. 
The three freighters were to proceed independently  to 
MatochkinSharwhere they were to rendezvous withKrasin 
(Fig. 2). The latter had  sailed  from  Leningrad on 17 July, 
and after a call at Murmansk  had  put to sea again on 7 
August (Anonymous, 1934; Belov, 1%9). Despite some 
fresh weather in the Barents Sea which  made  life rather 
miserable for the dogs in their exposed quarters on the 
fo’c’s’lehead, the freighters  made good time.  They  steamed 
through  Matochkin Sharon 12 August and dropped anchor 
off the weather station at its eastern end (Urvantsev, 
1978). Chelyuskin, just starting her passage of the Northern 
Sea Route, was already lying there, and some mutual 
visiting  went on among  officers and scientists. Krasin, too, 
was already here, and next morning,  with the icebreaker in 
the lead, the convoy headed east  into  the.Kam Sea. Chelyudin 
steamed off independently. 
The Lena convoy ran into ice almost immediately;  ini- 
t i dy  quite scattered and light,  by the following  day it was 
close and quite heavy. The channel broken by Krasin 
would  quickly drift shut again, so that the freighters  became 
jammed, obiiging the icebreaker to swing  back and break 
them free. Amazingly, at this point Urvantsev learned that 
Pravda’s captain, Kh. A. Belitskiy,  had never handled  a 
ship in ice before (Urvantsev, 1978). From time to time 
patches of fog complicated the situation. On the 15th 
Kra& received an SOS from CheEyUskin, following a more 
northerly course across the Kara Sea; she was  beset in 
close ice and making water in the forepeak due to damage 
received from the ice. Ordering the three freighters to 
had  south to open water, Krasin’s captain went to Chelyuskjn’s 
rescue. 
The Lena convay soon reached open water but they  had 
not come through unscathed. Pravda had a bent propeller 
blade, and Tovarishch Stalin had  a  leak in the forepeak; her 
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engineers  were  able to patch it  with cement. Swinging east 
again,  they  reached  Dikson  safely  on 18 August.  Already 
waiting there were the icebreaking steamers Sibiryukov and 
Rusanov. The former, commanded  by  Kapitan I.V. Khleb- 
nikov, was bound for Mys Chelyuskina to relieve and 
resupply the weather station there, established  only the 
previous  year (Ruzov, 1957). The latter, under the com- 
mand  of Kapitan  Yerokhin,  was  bound for Bukhta  Marii 
Pronchishchevoy, on the east side of Poluostrov Taymyr; 
on  board  was a huntindtrapping party led  by SIP. Zhurav- 
lev, who  had  filled the role of hunter and  dogdriver  on 
Ushakov’s  expedition to Severnaya Zemlya (Barr, 1975). 
Zhuravlev  and  his party planned to establish a permanent 
base  camp at Bukhta  Marii  Pronchishchevoy in order to 
exploit the resources of this uninhabited area of the Soviet 
Arctic (Astrova, 1933). Both Sibiryukov and Rusanov had 
been  detailed to assist Krusin in escorting the Lena convoy 
as far as Mys  Chelyuskina. 
The other participants in the expedition, the tug Pervayu 
Pyutiletku and  her lighter, reached Dikson on 21 August. 
They  had  sailed  from  Omsk on 18 July; this  slow  progress 
was  explained  by the fact that the tug  had  been  handling 
another two lighters as well, one bound for Novyy Port 
and the other for Dikson  (Yankovich,  1972).  The  voyage 
had  been a frustrating sequence of groundings  and  broken 
towing cables. 
Krusin reached Dikson on the 22nd, having rescued 
Chelyuskin from her plight; due to the icebreaker’s deep 
draught  Kapitan  Legzdin  was  obliged to anchor outside 
the harbour. Also at about this time the leader of the Lena 
expedition, B.V. Lavrov, flew in from Krasnoyarsk 
(Urvantsev, 1978). The entire expedition  was now assem- 
bled. 
At 11:OO a.m. on the 23rd Lavrov called a meeting on 
board Krusin, to which  he  invited  all the ships’ captains, 
Professor Urvantsev,, Professor V. Yu. Vize,  who  was in 
charge of the scientific  programme  on  board Sibiryukov, 
and  pilot  A.D.  Alekseyev (Morozov, 1934). Sibiryakov had 
already tried unsuccessfully to reach Mys Chelyuskina 
and hence the captains of the freighters, the first such 
ships to attempt to round  Mys  Chelyuskina,  were  under- 
standably  somewhat anxious. 
After considerable discussion  it  was  decided to attempt 
a route outside the Shkhery  Minina  and the Arkhipelag 
Nordenshel’da. Next day  Alekseyev  flew an ice recon- 
naissance  and  his report on his return was  favourable: a 
coastal polynia  some 25-80  km wide stretched eastwards 
from the Ostrova Kamenniye  (Yankovieh,  1972).  The con- 
voy  weighed anchor at 11:OO p.m. that evening.  The order 
of steaming was as follows: Krusin, Tovarishch Sralin, 
Pruvda,  Rusanov,  Volodarskiy, then Sibiryukov; thus ice- 
breaking  vessels alternated with freighters (Ruzov, 1959). 
Pervayu Pyutiletka and her lighter would wait at Dikson 
until the convoy  had  passed  Mys  Chelyuskina. 
At first, steaming east in open water at a steady six 
knots, the convoy was able to maintain this order, but 
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entering the ice on the 25th the order became  somewhat 
disarranged. The  freighters, especially Volodurskiy, re- 
peatedly  became jammed and Krusin had to go to their 
assistance. Early on the morning  of the 26th the ice  became 
much closer and the problems were compounded by dense 
fog.  Kapitan  Legzdin ordered the convoy to heave-to to 
wait for an  improvement.  When the fog  cleared  somewhat 
Krusin began smashing her way northeast past Ostrova 
Tillo (Morozov, 1934), the convoy  following astern. 
On  29 August Krusin left the convoy  hove-to in the ice 
near Ostrov  Russkiy  and  pushed ahead to find the best 
route into  Proliv  Vil’kitskogo.  After the icebreaker had 
steamed some 80 km to the northeast and Lavrov and 
Legzdin  had  satisfied themselves that there was a feasible 
route for the convoy, the icebreaker turned back. But the 
port propeller  happened to hit a particularly  tough floe, 
and  unfortunately the propeller  shaft  sheared (Morozov, 
1934; Zinger, 1948,  1966). 
Operating  with  only her two  remaining  propellers Krusin’s 
power  was  reduced  by  some 25% and her manoeuverability 
by  some 50%. Nevertheless it  was  decided to push  on  with 
the expedition; indeed there was  little alternative, since 
the icebreaker’s services were urgently needed. In her 
absence the freighters  had  been  subjected to quite severe 
ice pressures and Volodurskiy’s sides had  been  caved in 
slightly.  Despite the best efforts of Sibiryakov and Rusunov 
to free the freighters the situation had  looked  quite  ugly for 
some  time  (Anonymous, 1934; Zinger,  1966). 
Krasin had reached the convoy and, despite her  handi- 
cap, had  begun  cutting the freighters free when  early on 
the morning of  30 August  Alekseyev’s aircraft, SSSR-N2, 
roared overhead. Flying from Dikson Alekseyev had 
reconnoitred  ice  conditions as far  as Mys  Chelyuskina  and 
now,  circling  low over the convoy, he  indicated the best 
route to open water (Zinger, 1948,  1966). 
At  this  point a change in the wind  began to slacken the 
ice, easing Krusin’s task greatly. The ships  soon  emerged 
into  open water and  began  forging  steadily eastwards. But 
before  they  could reach the cape there was  yet another 
crisis. During the afternoon of the 31st Tovarishch Szulin 
radioed that the coal in her bunkers had  caught fire due to 
spontaneous combustion (Belov, 1969). It was a critical 
situation; barrels of gasoline  and  dynamite  were  stowed in 
her  holds. Krusin and Sibiryukov quickly  pulled  alongside 
the freighter  and the hard, dirty job of shifting  coal  began. 
Once the seat of the fire had  been  exposed  and  extinguished, 
the convoy  got under way  again. It reached  Mys  Chelyus- 
kina in the early hours of 1 September (Anonymous, 1934; 
Zinger, 1948; Urvantsev, 1978). 
Chelyuskin, bound for Bering Strait and escorted tempo- 
rarily by Sedov, arrived almost simultaneously (Ruzov, 
1957),  bringing the total to eight vessels, by far the largest 
fleet ever seen at this most northerly point of Eurasia. 
While  members  of off-duty watches  visited  between  ships 
or went ashore to visit the weather station (Zinger,  1966), 
Krusin bunkered  from Tovarishch Stulin (Morozov, 1934) 
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while Sibiryukov and Rusunov began  unloading  freight for 
Mys Chelyuskina. The assembled fleet soon dispersed. 
Since  ice  conditions in the Laptev  Sea were  very  open 
Lavrov  gave the Lena convoy  permission to proceed  inde- 
pendently to their destinations (Urvantsev, 1978). Pruvdu 
and Volodarskiy weighed anchor and  steamed east into the 
Laptev  Sea on the 1 st; Tovurishch Stulin followed  next day. 
On the evening of 2 September  Lavrov radioed Pervuyu 
Pyutiletka, still  waiting at Dikson, that she  should start east 
I for Mys  Chelyuskina  with  her  tow  immediately  (Yanko- 
vich, 1972) while Krusin headed  back  west to meet her. 
Pruvdu and Volodarskiy ran into some  ice southeast of the 
Ostrova  Samuila;  since  they  were  now  unescorted  it  caused 
acertain amount of alarm, particularly for Kapitan  Belitskiy 
(Urvantsev, 1978; Belov, 1969). But it was only a rela- 
tively  narrow  belt of ice  and the two freighters were  soon 
in open water again.  Despite quite strong  winds  and  heavy 
seas they  made  good progress south. 
By 4 September Pruvdu was  approaching  Bukhta  Nord- 
vik;  Kapitan  Belitskiy  had  decided to approach it from the 
east, between Poluostrov Paksa and Ostrov Bol’shoy 
Begichev.  Despite  having no knowledge of the depths in 
this fairly  narrow channel Belitskiy  forged ahead, albeit at 
slow speed, without  taking the elementary  precaution of 
sounding. The inevitable  happened: Pruvdu ran aground in 
the centre ofthe channel  (Anonymous, 1934; Zinger, 1948). 
Fortunately this  happened at low  tide  and the ship  could 
be  refloated  fairly  easily at high tide. Belitskiy retreated 
into deep water  again,  anchored,  and  proposed to Urvantsev 
that he  disembark the expedition using launches and  barges 
from that position. 
Urvantsev understandably demurred and  suggested that 
the captain send a boat ahead. to take soundings. The 
latter, however, refused to take his  fully  laden  ship into 
water where  such a precaution was necessary. Instead he 
called a meeting of the ship’s soviet and-its decision was 
that Pruvdu should head back north to Bukhta Marii 
Pronchishchevoy  where Rusunov was  establishing  Zhurav- 
lev’s  base camp, and  unload Urvantsev’s expedition there, 
despite the fact that it lay some 160 km from Bukhta 
Nordvik and on the wrong side of Khatangskiy Zaliv 
(Urvantsev, 1978). One can well  imagine the frustration of 
Urvantsev and the other expedition members at this 
obtuseness. 
To make matters worse, the survey vessel Pioner, 
manned  by  an  oceanographic party which  had  only just 
finished  sounding  Bukhta Nordvik, lay  only a short dis- 
tance away  on the west  side of Ostrov Preobrazheniya. 
Pioner had no radio and her crew knew nothing about 
Pruvdu calling at Bukhta Nordvik, nor indeed anything 
else about the Lena convoy. Similarly neither Lavrov, 
Belitskiy, nor Urvantsev knew of Pioner’s activities in 
these waters. In order to disseminate the results of their 
work to the best of their ability the oceanographers had set 
up stakes at intervals around the shores of Bukhta  Nordvik 
and  had  placed copies of the chart they  had  compiled  in a
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can attached to each stake. While Pruvdu lay  aground one 
of these stakes had been plainly visible on shore but 
Belitskiy  had  refused to send anyone to investigate. Alto- 
gether this was a total and disastrous breakdown in  com- 
munications. 
Despite having been warned by radio by Rusunov’s 
Kapitan  Yerokhin of a shoal across the mouth  of  Bukhta 
Pronchishchevoy , and of strong tidal currents, Belitskiy 
steamed  boldly into the mouth of the bay  without  sound- 
ing;  almost  predictably Pruvda ran aground  again,  but  this 
time  more  firmly.  Belitskiy  tried  in  vain to refloat  his  ship 
by  her  own efforts. Rusunov, which  had  still  not  finished 
unloading  Zhuravlev’s expedition, reached  her the next 
day  and  tried to tow  her free; the only  result  was  broken 
cables and damaged bitts. Some of Pruvdu’s cargo was 
offloaded onto floes  alongside,  and after floating to and fro 
with the tide for some  time  was  mostly recovered. Fuel 
and other cargo was also transshipped toRusunov (Astrova, 
1933; Urvantsev, 1978), andPruvdu’s water ballast  pumped 
out. Finally, on 14 September Rusunov managed to pull 
Pruvda off the shoal. 
Meanwhile Volodarskiy and Tovurishch Stalin had met 
with  somewhat better luck. Volodarskiy reached  Tiksi on 7 
September and Tovurishch Stulin the following day. But 
they  were greeted by some rather disturbing  news. In view 
of the lateness of the season the local authorities had 
decided that the freighters would  not  be  coming  and  had 
sent all the tugs  back  up the Lena for the winter  (Zinger, 
1948; Belov, 1969). Fortunately there were still several 
dozen  barges of various sizes available.  Making the best of 
the situation the ships’ crews began unloading into the 
barges, which were then towed ashore by a few  motor 
launches which were available  (Zinger, 1966). 
In the interim Pervuyu  Pyutiletka and her tow  had  safely 
negotiated the Arkhipelag  Nordenshel’da  and on 7 Sep- 
tember they reached Mys  Chelyuskina  with Krusin’s assis- 
tance (Zinger, 1966). On reaching  Tiksi  Kapitan  Mekeshin 
took  charge of the situation (Yankovich, 1972). With the 
tug’s considerable horsepower the task of lightering the 
cargoes ashore from the freighters proceeded  rapidly; 4388 
tonnes were transshipped in  only a few days. On 20 Sep- 
tember Pervuyu Pyutilerka started south up the Lena towing 
a string of barges  and  leading a small  convoy of assorted 
river craft. She reached Yakutsk safely on 26 October, 
fighting  ever-thickening  ice for most  of the voyage.  The 
freight  she  brought  was the first to reach Yakutsk  via the 
Northern Sea  Route since Lena had arrived from the west 
in 1878. 
Tovurishch Stulin and Volodarskiy sailed  on 16 September 
(Anonymous, 1934). Two days later they were met at 
75”06’N, 117’02’E by Krusin. The same day Tovurishch 
Stulin suffered a bent propeller blade in a collision  with a 
floe.  The  convoy  headed north through  relatively easy ice 
towards Proliv  Vil’kitskogo,  and on the 19th was joined by 
Rusunov. Next day Pruvda also joined the convoy  (Anon- 
ymous, 1934;Urvantsev, 1978). AsfarasMysChelyuskina 
~ 
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the young  ice presented no serious obstacles and the fields 
of old ice were small enough that they could be easily 
avoided. 
The  convoy passed abeam of Mys  Chelyuskina  on 21 
September and  it  must  have  seemed that the worst  was 
over. But the nights  were  now  sufficiently  dark that the 
convoy  was  forced to heave-to until  dawn and by  morning 
a current had carried the ships  back east through  Proliv 
Vil’kitskogo once again. Next day  they  battled  west once 
again,  through  increasingly  heavy  ice. BothPruvdu (Urvant- 
sev, 1978) and Tovurishch Stulin lost  propeller  blades, fur- 
ther slowing the convoy. Finally, late on the 22nd Lavrov 
was forced to accept the fact that the freighters were 
incapable of fighting their way through  Proliv  Vil’kitskogo. 
The convoy  headed  back east to the Ostrova Samuila 
(now Ostrova Komsomol’skoy Pravdy), some 110 kmfrom 
Mys  Chelyuskina, where it  was  decided the ships  would 
winter. They reached their destination around  noon  on the 
23rd. Krusin broke a channel for the convoy in the fast ice 
surrounding the islands and the three freighters were 
manoeuvered  until  they  lay  side-by-side in the middle  of 
the strait between the two  largest islands, sheltered  from 
allprobableicepressures(Anonymous, 1934;Ruzov,  1957). 
B.V. Lavrov stayed with the convoy as overall leader; 
Kapitan Smagin of Volodurskiy was  appointed  group  cap- 
tain of the wintering  ships and Urvantsev was  made leader 
of the scientific detachment. His orders were to mount a 
full  scientific  programme  including studies in meteorolo- 
gy, geology,  zoology and other disciplines.  The  scientific 
party totalled 17 people, including Dr. Urvantsev, the four 
half-track drivers and mechanics, a radio operator and a 
cook. A skeleton crew of 27 men was  left  aboard each 
ship.  The  remaining personnel transferred to Krusin and 
Rusunov, both of which  weighed anchor and  headed  west 
on 24 September. 
To save fuel  it  was  decided to keep  steam  up  only in 
Tovurishch Stulin’s boilers; she was  lying  between the other 
two ships  and connections could  easily  be  made  to their 
steam  heating systems. As a further energy-saving  meas- 
ure the personnel of one of the ships  was transferred to the 
two others. A strict schedule of activities was  laid  out for 
all  members  of the crews with strong emphasis  on  regular 
exercise. To this end it  was  decided that ice for the daily 
fresh water requirements of  5-6 tonnes would  be  chopped 
from  hummocks  and  hauled to the ships  by  hand.  In order 
to counter boredom  official courses in a variety of sub- 
jects, according to Nurkomvod’s official  programme,  were 
offered  on  board the wintering  ships (Uryantsev, 1978). 
One senses from Urvantsev’s account that he rather 
relished this opportunity to spend another winter  usefully 
in the Arctic, especially after the frustrating debacle in 
Bukhta  Nordvik. The very  next  day  he  went ashore with 
the senior carpenter I.N. Samoylov to select a site for the 
scientific station. Apart from its scientific functions it 
would also serve.as an  emergency  refuge if one or more of 
” the ships were crushed. The site Urvantsev chose was on 
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the southwestern part of the western island, about 8 km 
from the ships. 
By  now the ice  was quite thick  and on 26 September the 
half-tracks  were  offloaded onto the ice  and  began  hauling 
building materials to the site. On one of these trips a 
serious accident was  narrowly averted when one of the 
vehicles  broke  through  and  began to slide  backwards  into 
the water. The driver, Bezikin, and Urvantsev had the 
presence of  mind to hitch a cargo hook  from the ship’s 
derrick  around the front  axle  before th  vehicle  disappeared, 
and  it  was later salvaged; after a major  overhaul  it  was 
operational again. 
The base hut, which  was  intended for Bukhta Nordvik, 
was of frame  and  plywood construction, with  double  walls 
filled  with  sawdust for insulation. It measured 6 X 15 m 
and  contained  five bedrooms, a kitchen, dining-room  and 
lounge. Unheated porches were built on either end for 
storing coal, firewood and ice for water. The windows 
were  triple-glazed.  Ancillary  buildings  included a smaller 
hut for the radio station and weather office which also 
housed the radio operator and  his technician, a provisions 
store, a bath  house, agarage with  heated  workshop  attached, 
and  finally a hut for the dogs (Urvantsev, 1978). 
The shore station and the wintering ships were just 
settling  down to a regular routine when, in late October, a 
tragedy occurred. Yeliseyev, one of Tovurishch Srulin’s 
oilers, went  missing.  When the alarm  was  raised  two of the 
half-tracks  and  Lomachkin  with  his  dogteam drove out 
from the island  to the ships. It turned out that Yeliseyev 
had  gone  racing  off after a bear, alone  and  wearing  only a 
quilted jacket. A light  ground  drift  had  quickly overed his 
tracks, and by the time the search parties set out the drift 
was  even heavier. After  travelling 8 km in the direction in 
which  Yeliseyev  had  been  heading, the two vehicles  and 
the dogteam were forced to give up and turn back. A 
full-scale search involving  10-12  men on skis  was  planned 
for the following day, but by  morning a full  blizzard  was 
blowing.  The search was  called off as being  likely to result 
only  in further loss of life. 
In  November  tragedy struck again: Pustoshnyy, one of 
Volodurskiy’s engineers, disappeared one night during a 
particularly fierce blizzard. Preparations had  begun for a 
full-scale search when a pair of feet was spotted protrud- 
ing from the snow in the narrow gap, only some 1.5 m 
wide,  between  two f the ships.  The doctor’s post  mortem 
revealed a dislocated spine. Evidently  Pustoshynyy  had 
fallen  from the narrow  gangway  thrown  between the two 
ships  and  had  landed on his  head  on the rock-hard  snow 
some 4 m below. The blizzard  had  then  buried  his body. 
Next  day a grave  was excavated among the rocks on a 
little  islet about 3 km southwest of the ships  and a simple 
burial service was  held. 
Once the sun reappeared Urvantsev set in  motion  plans 
which  had  been  maturing  all  winter for a long-range  recon- 
naissance of the northern part of Poluostrov  Taymyr  using 
the half-tracks; it  would serve the twin  aims of adding to 
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the knowledge  of  this  little-known area and of providing 
experience of mechanized  winter travel in the High  Arc- 
tic. The expedition set off on the morning of  20 March  in 
clear, calm,  sunny weather with a temperature of  -32°C. 
The party consisted of Urvantsev, topographer  Teologov, 
and drivers Bezikin and Grachev. They took two half- 
tracks, each of which  towed a sledge  laden  with cans of 
gasoline. The sledges  were  light  enough to be  manhauled 
in the event that both  vehicles  broke  down. 
The route lay south past the Ostrova Vil’kitskogo, the 
vehicles  stopping every 1-2  km  while  Teologov completed 
his survey. On the second  day out what  might  have  been a 
serious accident occurred; Teologov  slipped  and  one  of 
the vehicle tracks ran over his foot. The  combination of 
soft snow, his  thick vulenki and the low ground-pressure of 
the vehicle restricted the damage to some bad bruises. 
Swinging  west  into  Zaliv Faddeya the party turned inland 
to follow the valley  of a small river flowing into the head of 
that inlet. A blizzard  pinned  them  down for four days but 
towards  evening on 31 March, despite rugged,  boulder- 
strewn terrain and  soft snowdrifts, the expedition  emerged 
at Zaliv  Dika  on the west side of Poluostrov Taymyr.  Here 
the party  camped at Mys Mogil’nyy near the graves of 
Leytenant A.N. Zhokhov and stoker I.N. Ladonichev, 
whohaddiedandbeenburiedduringthe 1914-1915wintering 
here of the Imperial  Navy icebreakers Taymyr and Vuyghch 
(Starokadomskiy, 1976; Kupetskiy, 1964). The  party mem- 
bers also located a cache of food  left by the same  expedi- 
tion, and  on  sampling  some of the canned  goods  found 
them  excellent. 
Pushing  north  towards the entrance to Proliv  Vil’kitskogo 
the party  made their next two camps at Mys  Palander  and 
at Mys  Vega (Urvantsev, 1978). They  reached the station 
at Mys  Chelyuskina  next  evening  and  were  made  warmly 
welcome  by L.V. Ruzov and his  staff. At Ruzov’s  invita- 
tion  they  spent a couple of days there, resting  and  making 
minor repairs to the vehicles. The final 95  km back to the 
wintering  base  were covered in  12 straight hours of driv- 
ing, the party reaching its destination on the evening of 9 
April. 
In May Urvantsev and  some  companions  made another 
trip, again  with two half-tracks, to Mys  Chelyuskina.  The 
purpose was to deliver  some aircraft parts, totalling about 
one tonne in weight, and also two aircraft floats. In view  of 
the awkwardness of the latter they  were  mounted  on  wheels 
and  towed  behind the vehicles.  This  time the route chosen 
was  in a nearly  straight  line across the sea ice; the party 
covered ~85 km to the station at Mys  Chelyuskina in  only 
eight  hours  and 20 minutes. They returned safely to their 
own  winter quarters next day. In total during the wintering 
the four half-tracks covered 7000  km and transported 2600 
tonnes of assorted freight. This performance promised 
well for the future of this type of vehicle in the Arctic. 
During the spring  an unexpected visitor  suddenly  arrived 
at the wintering site; this was Zhuravlev, travelling by 
dogteam  from  his  base at Bukhta  Marii  Pronchishchevoy 
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to Mys Chelyuskina to fetch a doctor, since there was 
sickness at the hunting base. The wintering  ships  and the 
shore station on the Ostrova Samuila came as a total 
surprise to him, since as far as he knew the ships had 
returned safely to Arkhangel’sk  in the autumn. 
It was decided that Dr. Urvantseva should return to 
Bukhta  Marii  Pronchishchevoy  with  Zhuravlev;  here the 
doctor found to her amazement that several of the 21 
people  (10 trappers, four women  and seven children)  were 
suffering  from scurvy. Even more  surprisingly,  it  had  been 
diagnosed  by  some  member of the group as venereal dis- 
ease and the victims  had  been ostracized and  denied access 
to the kitchen. The doctor stayed at the hunting  camp for 
11 days, by  which  time she  could see clear  signs of improve- 
ment as a result of the dietary changes she prescribed, 
then returned to Ostrova Samuila,  again by dogteam. 
There had  been a great deal of activity at the station in 
the meantime;  it  had  been  decided to make  this a perma- 
nent arctic weather station and hence the buildings  had to 
be  painted  and  generally  made  ready for prolonged  occu- 
pation. On board the ships preparations were under way 
for the upcoming  navigation season; by  trimming the  steam- 
ers down  by the head the damaged propellers were  exposed 
and  broken and bent blades could  be replaced. Meanwhile 
engines were reassembled. On 30 May the half-tracks 
were driven out to the ships and  loaded aboard Pruvdu for 
delivery to Bukhta  Nordvik. In early June the shore party 
all moved back aboard with the exception of the radio 
operator and  mechanic, who would stay to hand over the 
station to the relief party. 
There were two possible contenders for the privilege of 
freeing the wintering ships. The veteran icebreaker Yermuk 
would  be eastward bound to the Lena with the ships of the 
Second Lena Expedition, and Fedor Litke (Fig. 3)  would  be 
heading west from Vladivostok, attempting the first 
accident-ftee  one-season  passage of the  Northern  Sea  Route. 
The leader of the Litke expedition was Kapitan D.S. 
Dublitskiy (Vize, 1946); Kapitan N.M.  Nikolayev  was in 
command of the ship, while Professor V. Yu. Vize  was in 
charge of the scientific programme (Nikolayeva and 
Sarankin, 1963). 
Fedor Litke sailed  from  Vladivostok on 28 June 1934 and 
passed Bering Strait on the morning of 13 July (Vize, 
1934). She  was  considerably  delayed  by  ice in Proliv  Longa 
but  on 2 August she passed through  Proliv Lapteva into 
the Laptev Sea. As she approached the Taymyr coast she 
again entered ice  and  by the afternoon of 11 August  was 
manoeuvering  among  heavy  floes. Late on the evening of 
the 12th the masts and  funnels of Pruvdu, Volodarskiy and 
Tovurishch Stulin appeared dead ahead, but  between Litke 
and  them  lay 10 km  of unbroken fast ice. 
Nikolayev consulted with  Dublitskiy  and  his  officers. 
He was  very concerned about the condition of  his ship’s 
hull ; her  bows  had  been  badly  damaged  by  ice  during  her 
participation in the Northeast Polar Expedition to the 
mouth  of the Kolyma  in  1932-33 (Barr, 1979),  and  although 
\ 
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FIG. 3. The icebreaker Fcdor Litke. (Photo courtesy of Mr. Edward Wilson, Bumtisland, Fife.) 
she  had  received a refit  in Japan Nikolayev  and  his  officers 
were  extremely  apprehensive as  to the reliability of the 
repairs.  Nikolayev  was  fully  aware that Yermak was  on  her 
way east and  was  much better designed  than Lirke for this 
sort of task, but there was no way  of  knowing  when she 
would arrive. The critical factor was that Pruvdu still  had 
to unload at Nordvik  (Vize, 1946). 
In view  of this  Nikolayev  decided to tackle the obstacle 
despite  his  ship’s  damaged  condition. For five days Lirke 
battered at the ice, carving a channel  towards the trapped 
ships. With  some  of the impacts the ship’s bell would even 
ring of its own accord. Progress was extremely slow, 
sometimes  not  more  than 12-13 ship’s  lengths  per watch; 
the ice  was  up to 3.5 m thick  in  places. Litke’s bow  was  in 
no state to take this  kind of punishment  and the leaks 
became  steadily  worse.  Holds  and  engine  room  were  soon 
partially flooded despite constant pumping (Nikolayev 
and Sarankin, 1963). 
While Litke was  still several kilometres  from the trapped 
ships  Professor  Vize  invited Urvantsev, his  wife  and t h r e e  
others to walk out to  the icebreaker for a meal (Urvantsev, 
1978). The  occasion  was  marred  somewhat by a discovery 
they made  on  their  way across the ice: a human  skull  with a 
half-rotted  hat  was  found  lying on a pressure ridge.  The 
mystery of Yeliseyev’s disapperance was  solved. 
At 530 a.m.  on 17 August Lirke reached the trapped 
ships: five days to cover 10 km. But it was a hard-bought 
victory. A damage report requested by  Nikolayev  revealed 
severallongcracksinthebow, severalbowplatesloosened, 
and  one section of plating torn away. Once the engineers 
had  made  temporary repairs, Lirke. broke the freighters 
free, then  without  incident  led  them out to open  water by 
the channel she had carved  with  such  effort (Vize, 1946). 
Here the ships separated. Escorted by Lirke, Tovurishch 
Stalin headed  west  for  Proliv  Vil’kitskogo  and  Arkhangel’sk; 
Vdodarskiy headed fmTiksi  to load  coal  in order to bunker 
the ships of the Second Lena Expedition, while Pruvda 
pr ceeded  first to Bukhta Mari Pronchishchevoy to retrieve 
the fuel  and  boats she had  had to  jettison there. Then  she 
headed for her  initial destination, Bukhta  Nordvik,  once 
again. 
Professor  Vize  had  supplied Umantsev with a chart of 
the detailed  soundings of the bay  and its approaches. This 
showed clearly that by approaching from the west via 
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Khatangskiy  Zaliv, Pruvdu could  easily  get to within 60- 100 
m of the shore at Solyanaya Sopka, the expedition’s  goal. 
Using the chart Pruvdu’s captain managed to achieve  pre- 
cisely this. Rusunov had  already arrived with a new  crew of 
drillers. The half-tracks were  offloaded  immediately  and 
all the cargo  ferried ashore using  barges  lashed in pairs. By 
8 September the job was done and Pruvdu started for home 
(Urvantsev, 1978). She  was  among  the  last  freighters  escorted 
through  steadily  thickening grease ice  and  pancake  ice  in 
the southern part of the Kara  Sea (Sorokin  and Lur’ye, 
1951). 
Drilling at Nordvik over the next  few seasons revealed 
small,  shallow  oil pockets in connection with salt struc- 
tures (Urvantsev, 1978) but thus far they have had no 
commercial  significance. However the salt  itself  has  been 
worked  on a fairly  massive scale from the 1930s onwards, 
this being an important source of supply for the north, 
especiallyforthenorthernfisheries(Belov, 1969). Although 
the original prospects for oil at Nordvik  did  not in fact 
materialise, there can be  no doubt that the early experi- 
ence gained  here  in exploration for hydrocarbons within 
the continuous  permafrost  zone is now  proving  invaluable 
in the exploration  and  exploitation of the massive  oil  and 
gas  fields of Western  Siberia. 
With  regard to the Northern Sea Route operation, from 
its rather inauspicious start in 1933 the Lena expedition 
became  an  annual operation involving  considerable  num- 
bers of ships  and  large  volumes of freight.  Such  details as 
are available  have  been  documented by Armstrong (1952) 
and  Belov (1969). Most importantly, as mentioned earlier, 
the movement  of  goods to the Lena River  via the Northern 
Sea  Route  has  recently  acquired  new  emphasis in  n attempt 
to rectify the bottlenecks which  have  developed at Ust’-kut 
and  on the upper river. 
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